Bridge Note: The Ship of State is a huge vessel. It does not change course on a dime. Ignoring the higher-level communication chain that gives order to the Caption, the ship's communication chain passes from the Captain to various bridge crew members to the engine room and elsewhere about the ship, to align all hands with the tasks before them and implement the new headings and speeds. This PNAC document is the on-ship communication from the late 1990's that directed the crew (PNAC members who joined the Bush Administration) that would turn the Ship of State in a radical manner starting in September 11, 2001 (if you discount the overtly rigged 2000 election). This document contains much more than the often quoted passage about a new Pearl Harbor to motivate the masses into accepting and backing such change.
The report states that integrating information technologies into the military will take a long period of time, unless an unexpected attack reveals our technological inferiority, in the same way Pearl Harbor led to the huge expansion of our Navy.
It also "urges regime change in Iraq."
* PNAC saw Iraq (South Korea, and Iran) as a threat for acquiring ballistic missiles.
* PNAC wanted to project American force into the Gulf region with permanent military bases regardless of Saddam Hussein's regime, but that the unresolved Iraqi conflict provided immediate justification.
* PNAC wanted to transform the military with respect to global missile defenses, control of space and cyberspace, and conventional forces (like using contractors and mercenaries). However, such change to the military would not happen quickly without a catalyst and needed to occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategies.
Connect the freakin' dots. With 9/11 as the catalyst, PNAC (who by then had become influential members of the Bush Administration) could and did achieve its shopping list.
The military exhibits its control of cyberspace as part of the wishlist:
If outer space represents an emerging medium of warfare, then “cyberspace,” and in particular the Internet hold similar promise and threat. And as with space, access to and use of cyberspace and the Internet are emerging elements in global commerce, politics and power. Any nation wishing to assert itself globally must take account of this other new “global commons.”
The Internet is also playing an increasingly important role in warfare and human political conflict. From the early use of the Internet by Zapatista insurgents in Mexico to the war in Kosovo, communication by computer has added a new dimension to warfare.
Expanded sections from the document.
Section III REPOSITIONING TODAY'S FORCE states (emphasis added):
The current American peace will be short-lived if the United States becomes vulnerable to rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland itself.
The presence of American forces in critical regions around the world is the visible expression of the extent of America's status as a superpower and as the guarantor of liberty, peace and stability. Our role in shaping the peacetime security environment is an essential one, not to be renounced without great cost: it will be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the role of global guarantor without a substantial overseas presence. ... Whether established in permanent bases or on rotational deployments, the operations of U.S. and allied forces abroad provide the first line of defense of what may be described as the "American security perimeter."
Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, this perimeter has expanded slowly but inexorably. ... In the Persian Gulf region, the presence of American forces, along with British and French units, has become a semipermanent fact of life. Though the immediate mission of those forces is to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, they represent the long-term commitment of the United States and its major allies to a region of vital importance. Indeed, the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
And Section V CREATING TOMORROW'S DOMINANT FORCE states (emphasis added):
To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs. Information technologies, in particular, are becoming more prevalent and significant components of modern military systems. These information technologies are having the same kind of transforming effects on military affairs as they are having in the larger world. The effects of this military transformation will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what kinds of weapons will dominate the battlefield and, inevitably, which nations enjoy military preeminence.
Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. ... A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for projecting force from the United States, for example, and sacrificed forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American policy goals and would trouble American allies.
Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor. Domestic politics and industrial policy will shape the pace and content of transformation as much as the requirements of current missions.
In general, to maintain American military preeminence that is consistent with the requirements of a strategy of American global leadership, tomorrow's U.S. armed forces must meet three new missions:
* Global missile defenses. ...
* Control of space and cyberspace. Much as control of the high seas - and the protection of international commerce - defined global powers in the past, so will control of the new "international commons" be a key to world power in the future. An America incapable of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or the "infosphere" will find it difficult to exert global political leadership.
* Pursuing a two-stage strategy for of transforming conventional forces. ... This process must take a competitive approach, with services and joint-service operations competing for new roles and missions.